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NOTES
THE CLEAN-HANDS DEFENSE IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUITS:
AN EXPANDED CONCEPT*
Two factors have combined to make the patent field particularly fruitful
of conflict between private claim and public interest. The first is the double
aspect of the patent itself, as a sanction of exclusive privilege, purportedly1
granted in furtherance of a broad social objective. The second, and the more
specific, is the extensive overlap of the domains controlled by the frankly
monopolistic patent system and by the anti-trust laws. A special and acute
problem under the latter head arises with respect to the so-called "tying
clauses", by means of which the patentee seeks to impose upon his licensee,
as a condition of license, an obligation to purchase from the patentee or from
his nominee other goods or materials, for use in connection with the inven-
tion.2 Section 3 of the Clayton Act 3 lays an interdiction upon such contracts
where they result in lessening of competition or creation of monopoly.
Two separable questions are suggested by the tying-contracts practice, and
are raised by the Morton Salt case.4 First, by whom and under what cir-
cumstances may the illegality or repugnance to public policy of the tying
clause be raised? Secondly, how broad a conception of public policy is to
govern the disposition of such a plea? Prior to the principal case, these
questions had been set in a very different theoretical framework from that
which must be constructed to accommodate the present holding.
* Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 402 (U. S. 1942).
Plaintiff-petitioner brought suit for injunction and accounting against an alleged
direct infringer of its patent on a machine for depositing salt. The alleged infringement
consisted in manufacture and leasing of competing machines. The District Court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, upon a showing that plaintiff required its licensees
to use its own salt in the machines. 31 F. Supp. 876 (N. D. Ill., 1940). Defendant was
not shown to have been injured by this practice, nor to have had any connection there-
with. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that violation of § 3 of the
Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1940), had not been shown. 117 F.
(2d) 968 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941). In reversing that holding, a unanimous court, speaking
through Mr. Chief Justice Stone, held that violation of the Clayton Act, a penal statute,
was not decisive, as plaintiff's practice was in any case opposed to public policy. It was
expressly assumed that defendant was not hurt by plaintiff's licensing policy, and the
court refused to apply the theory that plaintiff's misconduct, to constitute matter for a
clean-hands defense, must be integrated with the particular events raising the equity. An
overriding public policy was believed to make inapplicable the stricter equity rule.
1. "The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries ;" U. S. CoNST. ART. I, § 8 cl. 8.
2. See HAMILTON, TNEC REP., PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE, Monograph 31
(1941) 62-70; Havighurst, The Legal Status of Industrial Control by Patent (1941)
35 ILL L. REv. 495, 504.
3. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1940).
4. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 402 (U. S. 19,12).
From the time of the overruling of the A. B. Dick case,a in Motion Picture
Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing Comnpany, the federal
courts have moved toward a strict attitude with respect to use of the patent
as a means of securing monopoly in unpatented materials. The prohibition has
been e.x'tended to a case in which the licensee was offered a choice between use
of the patentee's materials and other terms considered so unreasonable as
to be coercive.7 The patentee has been barred from relief against contributory
infringers whose offense consisted in supplying to direct infringers the ma-
terials in which monopoly was sought.8 Where, though not formally licensing
with condition annexed, the process patentee has sought to implement a
monopoly in an unpatented material by selling the latter with an implied
license to use the process, and by refusing to license on other terms, the
courts have refused to be puzzled by the obvious.' And even where the
patentee has offered proof of another patent on the material tied to the patent
in suit, it has been held that tying may not be used to avoid a full adjudication
regarding such other patent.'0
There have been many attempts at analysis of the theory or theories under-
lying these decisions."' A recent summary'
- suggests that two alternative
concepts have been at work: a "claims construction" theory, limiting the
protected domain of the patentee to the scope of the patent itself, and hence
disabling him from bringing a suit aimed at the protection of an interest
in a commodity outside the patent grant: and, on the other hand, a "use
restriction" theory, relating not at all to the scope of the patent ws a matter
of construction, but rather to the permissible scope of its use in litigation.ia
5. Henry v. A. B. Dick & Co., 224 LT. S. 1 (1912).
6. 243 U. S. 502 (1917).
7. Barber Asphalt Corp. v. La Fern Grecco Contracting Co., 116 F. (2d) 211, 214
(C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
8. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 2R3 U. S. 27 (1931).
9. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458 (1938); American Lecithin Co.
v. Warfield Co., 105 F. (2d) 207 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. C99 (1939).
Cases of this kind are the most numerous, owing to the difficulty of exploiting many
process patents on any other basis. See Henry. Limitations Inherent it the Grant of
Letters Patent (1942) 27 CORq. L. Q. 214, 229. But this difficulty seems to have been
rejected as a ground for relaxation of the rule. See B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 02 Sup.
Ct. 406, 408 (U. S. 1942).
10. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131, 137
(1936). The case was an antitrust action, and the direct holding is only that patent rights
in the tied material do not justify tying under the Clayton Act. Under the thery of limi-
tation inherent in the grant, such illegality might not be held to bar infringement suit, as
plaintiff could plausibly argue that it was not attempting to extend its patent monopoly
except into a domain equally its own. Under the broad equitable doctrine of the principal
case, one making such a plea would at least have something new to answer.
11. See, e.g., HAMILTON, 1oe. Cit. supra note 2; Feuer, The Patent 3Monopoky and the
Anti-Trust Laws (1938) 38 CoL. L. Ray. 1145.
12. Henry, Limitations Inherent in the Grant of Letters Patent (1942) 27 C02,-;.
L. Q. 214.
13. "The questions are, what restraint would be imposed by the grantig of the
prayer, and, is such a restraint lawful." Id. at 218 (italics supplied).
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This permissible scope would be delimited by the law other than the patent
law; apparently Section 3 of the Clayton Act, considered both as strict law
and as a declaration of public policy, adequately accounts for the results in
most of the decided cases.
The "claims construction" theory has been properly criticised.14 The "use
restriction" theory, so called, appears more adequate to justify and explain
past judicial action. But its latest and most articulate expositorl" does not
appear to believe that transgression of the boundary of permissible use
should work a general forfeiture of the patent ipso facto.1' It is needless
to say that no case would support any such proposition. Hence it would
appear that a defense upon the ground of such transgression would bear
a close analogy to the defense of illegality in an action ex contractu17 -a
defense which would of course be available either to the obligor or to one
wrongfully inducing breach, the analogues, respectively, of the direct and
contributory infringers. When a patentee "seeks judicial sanction for any
condition so prohibited, relief must be denied him, for no court has power
to countenance that which the law forbids."' 8 It is use in litigation that is
restricted, and the weapon of restriction is dismissal upon a showing that
the suit at bar is brought to implement an illegal course of dealing, or one
obnoxious to public policy.
This concept is logically satisfying, but it must be observed that, in prac-
tice, it necessarily will result in confinement of the matters raised in defense.
Conceivably, a patentee might impose any sort of illegal condition upon his
licensee, and might, in consequence, be denied relief against an infringement
consisting in violation of the condition, or against a contributory infringe-
ment consisting in abetting such violation. In practice, patentees will im-
pose conditions commercially advantageous to themselves; this in turn means
that they will seek to win from the licensee special commercial concessions
withheld from others, and this will usually amount to some form of restraint
of trade. Tying clauses, the exclusive use of licenses implied by material
sales, and enforced retail price maintenance are typical devices. The fore-
going may explain why monopoly or restraint of trade almost invariably
constitute the subject-matter of the defense on grounds of the patentee's
improper use, while this fact in turn explains the vogue of the "claims con-
struction" theory. The latter concept would have been clearly inadequate
and indeed irrelevant with respect to cases in which the patentee sought,
14. See Id. at 216.
15. See id. at 218.
16. There is, indeed, a hint of such a view in an addendum covering the principal
and a companion case. See id. at 236. But the author may intend to suggest that tile
"legal existence" of the patent is merely suspended during the period of the patentee's
misconduct. In point of doctrine, this does not seem to be what the Supreme Court is
saying, but there may be little difference in practice.
17. The analogy lies only in the fact that in both cases it is, strictly speaking, tile
employment of the court's machinery to implement or enforce the illegal scheme itself
that is forbiaden.
18. Henry, supra note 12 at 218 (italics supplied).
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not to "extend his monopoly" beyond the scope of the patent, but to impose
some non-monopolistic but otherwise illegal condition.
It must be observed that this practical narrowing of the matters raised in
defense is closely integrated with the limitation upon parties entitled to
interpose such a defense; indeed, the two limitations are merely different
aspects of the same rule. Hitherto, no one has been allowed to raise the
defense of illegality or repugriance to public policy, unless the very suit in
which the defense is raised implements or bears direct relation to that mis-
conduct.19 But the only defendants are infringers, either direct or contribu-
tory. And, as suggested above, by far the commonest type of wrong-doing
of which the patentee will have been guilt), as against infringers, and in
connection with his patent and with his infringement action, is the attempt
at one of several rather restricted sorts of restraint of trade. He may have
used his patent in a hundred ways either unlawful or antisocial, without
ever having injured the particular infringer sued, and certainly without rela-
tion to the cause of action sued upon. As long, then, as conduct injurious
to the defendant and linked with the plaintiff's action must be the foundation
of this defense, the availability of the defense can have little deterrent effect
on any abuses other than those usually implemented and directly aided by
infringement litigation.
It is easy to see what may be the effect if, upon any theory whatever,
another than the injured party may interpose, in an infringement suit, a
defense of illegality or public policy, and if the conduct complained of need
only be connected with the patent, and not necessarily with the particular
infringement alleged. There would seem to be no reason at all for con-
ceiving the public policy of Section 3 of the Clayton Act to be superior to
any other formulation of public policy. It is true that the patent act itself
is law, and hence declaratory of public policy ;2 but so, it may be remarked,
is the constitutional language granting the patenting power.21 And if an
admitted infringer of a valid patent may win a dismissal because the patentee-
plaintiff (ex hypothesi without injury to the defendant) 22 has utilized his
patent in an attempt to secure a monopoly, or has violated either the letter
or the policy of the Clayton Act,23 it seems tenable to suppose that a patentee
may in the future be barred from relief upon proof of his use of the patent
for any purpose contravening a public policy of equal dignity with the one
invoked in the principal case. The doctrine announced in the principal case
might even lead to the eventual articulation of the policy declared in the
patent clause of the Constitution.
19. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240 (1933), is not a
real exception. The court, at 245, expressly denies it to be such, and plaintiff's rniscon-
duct, while perhaps not technically infecting its cause of action, had been made the basis
for preparation of the suit. (The case was not concerned with tying contracts or monop-
oly).
20. See License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 469 (U. S. 1S67).
21. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, quoted note I sitpra.
22. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 402, 404 (U. S. 1942).
23. Ibid.
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The principal case, therefore, while ostensibly a mere enlargement of the
class of persons entitled to raise a defense based upon a given type of wrong-
doing, may serve as a transition from a period in which patent rights were
conceived as somehow not subject to be tempered to social ends, into one
in which the patentee may find his effective remedy conditional upon his use
of the patent in conformity to all the law and declared policy of the state.
Such a condition, stated abstractly, would create a great deal of confusion
as to the scope of permissible conduct,24 but that confusion might be dis-
pelled by progressive judicial definition.
The references in the principal case to the plaintiff's attempt at monopoly,
and to the earlier cases dealing with monopolistic practices as a bar to
patent sUits,2 5 are believed to be no more than a specification of plaintiff's
misconduct, and certainly do not suggest that attempted monopoly has been
arbitrarily selected as the only violation of public policy capable of supporting
a clean-hands defense. Broad language elsewhere in the opinion weighs
against such a view.26 One limitation does, however, remain. It is clearly
implied that denial of relief on grounds of public policy may be expected
only where success in the infringement suit would indirectly assist the patentee
in the consummation of the unsocial scheme.27 In practice, it may be assumed
that few cases will occur in which success in such a suit will not in some
degree help the patentee in a course of action depending for its success upon
the patent.
28
No attempt has been made to add to the literature dealing with the the-
oretical basis of past decisions in the tying-clause or contiguous fields. The
analogy with the defense of illegality or public policy in contract actions, 0
an application (with a stricter rule regarding injury to the defendant)"'
of the clean-hands doctrine, or a concept of an inherent limitation upon the
patent suit as a sui generis action, 3' may separately or together explain the
past cases. The important thing is that the "clean-hands" defense, tinder
24. Not because public policy external to the patent law is harder to define here
than in any other field, but because it must be admitted that, even though not regarded
as a grant of general immunity from all social requirements, the patent does unquestion-
ably confer certain rights more or less opposed in tendency to public interests articu-
lated in other law.
25. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 402, 404-05 (U. S. 1942).
26. Id. at 405.
27. Ibid.
28. The Court appears to be convinced that this causal relation will generally exit
where patentee is using his patent "as a means of restraining competition." Attention is
even given to the intangible but highly important factor of "persuading the public of the
validity of the patent . . ." Ibid. It is submitted that, with this last quantity in the
equation, there should in future be a strong presumption that every infringemeiit stilt
practically aids whatever uses the patentee may be making of his patent.
29. See note 17 supra.
30. That is, with the more usual equity rule, from which the principal case repre-
sents a departure. See note 35 infra.
31. See, e.g., the language in Julius Kayser & Co. v. Rosedale Knitting Co., 18 F.
Supp. 836, 838 (E. D. Pa. 1937), aff'd, 98 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), cert. delmed,
305 U. S. 649 (1938).
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whatever name, might previously have been thought limited by requirements
of injury to the defendant and direct connection with the patentee's cause
of action. The principal case has removed the suspicion of these limitations.
The superficial result is to make the "tying-clause defense" available to more
defendants than hitherto. By clear implication, the case seems to open tip
the whole field of public policy as material for the clean-hands defense, and
to force upon the patentee a new circumspection.
To accomplish this result, the court has based the decision squarely upon
the equitable doctrine of "clean-hands". 32 Equity has long sought a resting-
place between the obvious impracticability of requiring "blameless lives"-
of its suitors, and a natural reluctance to become party to proceedings even
on the periphery of an enterprise against the public interest.34 The more
orthodox formulation would require, for maintenance of the clean-hands
defense, some wrong to the defendant himself.3, But clearly where, as a
practical matter, the granting of relief would abet anti-social conduct, the
court must refuse to stultify itself, even though dismissal may come to the
defendant as an undeserved good fortune.
An interesting question may arise with respect to the availability of the
clean-hands doctrine of the principal case as a basis for declaratory relief
in a suit by infringer against patentee. There is a dearth of authority on
the standing of patentee's monopolistic use of the patent as a basis for declara-
tory relief under the relatively constricted doctrines of the older cases. 0
In addition, certain peculiar ways of talking about the clean-hands maxim
might at first seem to make it inappropriate as a basis for affirmative action
even on the part of one clearly entitled to rely on it as defendant.31 Yet it
32. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger, 62 Sup. Ct. 402, 405 (U. S. 1942).
33. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216, 229 (1934), cited in the principal case,
62 Sup. Ct. 402, 405.
34. See, e.g., Williams v. Dutton, 184 Il. 603, 56 N. E. 86S (1900). Cases involv-
ing misrepresentation to the public sometimes illustrate expansion of the usually con-
stricted meaning given to the words, "subject matter of the suit." See Fay v. Laim-
bourne, 124 App. Div. 245, 108 N. Y. Supp. 874 (1st Dep't 1908), aff'd witlout opdion,
196 N. Y. 575 (1909).
35. 2 PoMi:ERoY, EQuiTy JuRIsPRUDENCE (Symons' ed. 1941) 99.
36. In Steiner v. Schwartz, 98 F. (2d) 999 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938), cert. delied, 305
U. S. 662 (1939), plaintiff sought a declaration that defendant's licensing agreements
violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The claim was considered and rejected on the
merits. But plaintiff's purpose in seeking the declaration is not clear. That a daim
was made and rejected on a theory of flat illegality differentiates the facts of that case
from those of the principal case. Violation of the Clayton Act need not be shown for
the maintenance of the clean-hands defense. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 62
Sup. Ct. 402, 404 (U. S. 1942).
37. "It [the clean-hands maxim] says that whenever a party, who, as actor [italics
in original], seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has
violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then
the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; . . ." 2 Powlmoy, op. cit.
supra note 35, at 91. In Sakon v. Santini, 257 Mich. 91, 241 N. NV. 160 (1932), the court
refused to apply the maxim against one brought in by interpleader, saying, at p. 93:
"Based on the maxim, a refusal of the court to act is as against one who seeks its active
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is believed the objections to such use evanesce upon analysis. Any good
potential defense ought to be allowed as a basis for declaratory relief, pro-
vided other essential conditions, including threat of suit by the patentee,
are present.3 8 It seems needless to dwell upon the enormous expansion of
the strategic importance of the clean-hands defense, if it may be used not
only to defeat suits for infringement, but also to force an issue on the
patentee's threat, and, by way of counterclaim, to prevent dismissal of an
infringement action once instituted. 39
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.t
SEC INTERPRETATION OF "HOLDING COMPANY" AND
"AFFILIATE" UNDER THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANY ACT.
THE control exercised over the utility industry by holding companies
dominated by outside financial interests brought dangers of excessive rates
to consumers and dissipation of investors' holdings.' To remedy this situa-
tion, Congress provided for geographic integration of holding companies
and for regulation of security issues and various intercorporate financial
ipterposition." In the most super-refined doctrine, it would seem that the court refuses
its aid not precisely because the plaintiff has behaved inequitably, but because, having
so behaved, he has the temerity to seek judicial assistance. It is to be hoped that the
practical considerations which led to the introduction of the declaratory judgment will
outweigh this impalpable concept.
38. "It is only in the clearest case ... , where the prospective plaintiff's suit is
imminent or where the issue would not be determined by the declaration, that a court
should disregard the legal interest of a prospective defendant in averting trouble, in re-
pelling an unjust claim, and in clearing his right or title . . ." BORCHARD, DECLARATOaY
JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941) 349.
39. The strategic gains to the alleged infringer would be, in general, the same as
those acquired by the winning of the right to declaratory relief on the issues of validity
and infringement. See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 38, at 802. Expansion of the In-
fringer's use of the clean-hands defense naturally expands the inhibitory effect of the
defense upon patentees, and so its scope as a safeguard for social interests.
t Second-Year Class, Yale Law School.
1. Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 468, 472 et seq. Among the factors making for
unparalleled use of the holding company in the utility field were relaxation of state in-
corporation laws governing holding of stock in one company by another, and lack of regu-
lation of the securities markets. In addition, the unique, non-competitive nature of public
utilities made combinations based on them less susceptible to regulation under the Shei-
man and Clayton Acts. And state utility commissions were unable to control effectively
holding companies which fell outside the statutory definition of utilities and in any event
usually transcended state boundaries. See BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COM-
PANY (1932) 55 et seq.; SEN. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) Pt. 72A, 13,
23 et seq., Pt. 73A, 2 et seq., 201-02 (hereinafter cited as UTILITY CORPORATIONS).
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relations 2 in the Public Utility Holding Company Act.3 As criteria defining
the firms to which these broad controls in the Act should apply, Congress
framed definitions of "holding company" 4 and "subsidiary".r In addition,
the concept of an "affiliate" of any holding company or subsidiary was set
up to aid in regulating certain intercompany transactions such as service
contracts between affiliates and any company covered by the Act.7
The definitions contained in the Act provide an opportunity for flexibility
in administration by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Under
Section 2(a) (7),8 any company holding ten percent uf the voting stock of
a public utility operating company, or of another holding company, becomes
prima facie a holding company subject to the Act. But the Commission may
grant exemptions under certain conditions, notably if the holding company
does not exert such a controlling influence over its statutory subsidiary as
to make regulation under the Act necessary "in the public interest". More-
over, the Commission may subject to regulation any person, regardless of
stock ownership, if the person is found to be exercising such a controlling
influence over a public utility or holding company that the public interest
requires regulation under the Act. The definition of a "subsidiary" in
Section 2(a) (8) 9 is substantially the converse of that of a "holding corn-
2. Comment (1936) 45 YA.La L. J. 468, 482 et scq.
3. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 STAr. 9O3 (1935), 15 U. S. C.
§ 79 (1940) (hereinafter cited by section number only).
4. Section 2(a) (7).
5. Section 2(a) (8).
6. Section 2(a) (11).
7. Sections 791, 79m.
S. Section 2(a) (7). "Holding company" means (A) any company which directly or
indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 10 per centum or more of the
outstanding voting securities of a public-utility company or of a company which is a hold-
ing company by virtue of this clause or clause (B), unless the Commission, as herein-
after provided, by order declares such person not to he a holding company; and
(B) any person which the Commission determines, after n-tice and opportunity f.r
hearing, directly or indirectly to exercise (either alnne or lpursuant t0 an arrangement
or understanding with one or more other persons) such a controlling influence over
the management or policies of any public-utility or h,,lding company as to malhe it
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pr,,tection of invest-Jrs or c,,n.
sumers that such person be subject to the obligatikns, dutie, and liabilities impoed
in this title upon holding companies.
The Commission, upon application, shall by order declare that a company is nat a
holding company under clause (A) if the Commission finds that the applicant . . .
(iii) does not, directly or indirectly, exercise (either alone or pursuant to an arrange-
ment or understanding with one or more other persons) such a controlling influence .. .
as to make it necessary or appropriate in the public interest . . . that the applicant LU
subject to the obligations . . .imposed in this title upon holding companies ...
9. Section 2(a) (8). "Subsidiary company" of a specified holding company means-
(A) any company, 10 per centum or more of the outstanding securities of which are
directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such holding
company (or by a company that is a subsidiary company of such holding company by
virtue of this clause or clause (B) .. .
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pany". Under Section 2(a)(11)110 the looser relation of an "affiliate" is
automatically created by a five percent holding of voting stock. Moreover,
in transactions between any person and a company subject to the Act,
the Commission may find that the likelihood of an absence of arm's
length bargaining makes it necessary that the person be declared an affiliate
and thus regulated by the Act. Thus the standards defining the inclusiveness
of the Act turn ultimately on requirements of the public interest, as deter-
mined by the Commission in the light of the Act's objectives. Similar statu-
tory tests have been upheld on constitutional grounds." And the experience
of state regulatory commissions,' 2 together with the hearings"a preceding
10. Section 2(a) (11). "Affiliate" of a specified company means-
(A) any person that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to
vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such specified com-
pany;
(B) any company 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are
owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, directly or indirectly, by such specified
company;
(C) any individual who is an officer or director of such specified company, or any
company which is an affiliate thereof under clause (A) of this paragraph; and
(D) any person or class of persons that the Commission determines, after appro-
priate notice and opportunity for bearing, to stand in such relation to such specified
company that there is liable to be such an absence of arm's-lcngth bargaining in transac-
tions between them as to make it necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors or consumers that such person be subject to the obligations,
duties, and liabilities imposed in this title upon affiliates of a company.
11. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond and Mortgage Co., 289 U. S.
266, 285 (1933) ; New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 24
(1932).
Among the objectives listed in the Act are regulation of issuance of securities by
holding companies and their subsidiaries, and furnishing investors with adequate infor-
mation; regulation of transactions between subsidiaries and holding companies; facilita-
tion of state regulation; elimination of uneconomical methods of raising capital; and in-
tegration and simplification of holding company systems. For the abuses resulting from
the use of the holding company in the public utility field see BONRIGHT AND MEANS, TIul
HOLDING COMPANY (1932) 153 et seq.; UTILITY CORPORATIONS, Pt. 73A, 61 et seq.
12. MASS. SPECIAL ComImIssioN REPORT ON CONTROL AND CONDUCT OF PUBLIC UT.I-
TIES (1930) 27 et seq., 66, 248; NEW YORK (STATE) CotmmIssxoN REPORT ON REVISION
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COlMSSION LAW (1930) Vol. 1, pp. 26, 141-42, 144; MoslEtt
AND CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1933) 362 et seq.; Marlett and Taylor,
Public Utility Legislation in the Deprcssion (1935) 11 J. LAND & P. U. EcoN. 173, 177;
Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 941, 945.
13. "The definition [of holding company] is made flexible enough to prevent evasion
by simple alterations of form rather than substance (as has been the experience under
other legislation where affiliation or holding companies were defined upon the basis of a
specified stock ownership)." Hearings before Committee o Interstate Commerce on
S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 51; id. at 211; Hearings before Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Conmnerce on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 76-77;
UTILITY CORPORATIONS, Pt. 73A, p. 202 n. 35; H. R. Doc. No. 137, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935) 9; S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 5. For problems of inclu-
sign and exclusion in framing the definition see, Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 941,
945; BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 8 et seq. On techniques of control
[Vol. 511020
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the passage of the Act, indicated the need for such flexible criteria in defining
the application of the Act.
The Commission has adopted a broad interpretation of "controlling in-
fluence" in refusing petitions for exemption from regulation.14 For example,
in an early case 15 H. M. Byllesby and Co. was denied exemption from the
status of a prima facie holding company created by its stock ownership in
Standard Gas and Electric Co. and its subsidiaries. Byllesby's dominant
position in the Standard System dated from formation of Standard Gas in
1910 by Byllesby. This dominance was undermined in 1929 in a fight with
an outside group for control of Standard's voting stock, and in a subsequent
reorganization. 16 However, this reduction of Byllesby's control was not suffi-
cient to prove absence of a present "controlling influence" in view of the
long history of control by Byllesby over Standard and in view of Byllesby's
continued underwriting of Standard System securities. Transfer of Byllesby's
holdings of Standard stock to a voting trust was held not to have terminated
this long-continued influence ;17 since some of the trustees of the voting trust
had been associated with, and all were paid by, Byllesby,18 petitioner could
by a minority interest see, H. R. RE!'. No. 827, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), Pt. 2, 84
et seq. (hereinafter cited as RELr.TioN oF HOLDING COMPANIES TO O A:o CoMx-
rAxiES); UTH.ITy CoaPoa IrONs, Pt. 72A, 136 et seq.; BEn1. AND MErANs, Tn MoDznr;
CoRPORAToIN AND PRavATE Paopzary (1932) 69 ei seq.
14. The Commission has exercised several times its powerunder §2(a)(8)(B) to
declare on its own motion, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the public inter-
est required that certain non-registering companies be designated as subsidiaries. Shinn
& Co., 7 S. E. C. 333 (1940); Associated General Utilities Co., 4 S. E. C. 526 (1939);
Employees Welfare Ass'n, 4 S. E. C. 792 (1939); Utilities Employees Securities Co.,
4 S. E. C. 806 (1939).
15. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 6 S. E. C. 639 (1940). Byllesby owned more than ten
percent of the voting stock of Standard Gas and Electric Company.
16. By the terms of an agreement settling the fight Byllesby and the opposition
group shared future underwriting of Standard System companies. In addition, Byllesby
was to have the power of electing a majority of the directors of Standard Gas, but in a
subsequent reorganization of Standard this power was reduced to that of electing, in
combination with the opposition group, four out of nine Standard Gas directors. For a
description of the control exercised by bankers in reorganization proceedings, see S. E. C.
REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcTIvITIES, PERSONNEL- AND
FUNCIONS OF PRoTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITrEES (193S) Pt. I, p. M
et seq. For a good description of the fight for control of the Standard System, see Hear-
ings before TNEC Pursuant to P. R. 113, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) v. 10, 578 c scq.
17. Byllesby argued that after transfer of the stock to the voting trust it did not
own or hold the stock with power to vote within the meaning of § 2(a) (7) and therefore
was not even prima facie a holding company within the automatic part of the definition.
The Commission overruled this contention and stated that beneficial ownership of the
stock, alone, was enough to bring Byllesby within the definition. Compare Cities Ser-
vice Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 2444, Dec. 23, 1940, at 7 et seq.;
Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp., 1 S. E. C. 374 (1936) (petitioner owned all voting
stock in a public utility; exemption granted because had transferred to another party all
voting rights under a proxy agreement).
18. Two new trustees were appointed just prior to the hearing. One had previously
been elected a director of Standard Gas and had been connected with the investment
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
not meet the burden of proving 9 that interpolation of the voting trust had
freed Standard from the "controlling influence".
In the only judicial review of a Commission ruling under Section 2(a) (7)
or (8), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the Commission's
denial of Detroit Edison's petition for exemption, 20 and expressly stated that
controlling influence was less than an absolute domination of the subsidiary
by the holding company. "Controlling influence" means not necessarily that
those exercising it "must be able to carry their point" but rather such influ-
ence as "may be effective without accomplishing its purpose fully." 21 In
addition, under a series of Commission rulings, if a holding company is
capable of exerting a controlling influence over a subsidiary, the mere fact
that it has not exercised its potential influence will not be sufficient to gain
for it an exemption
22
Other indicia of a holding company's controlling influence have been
set forth in a series of Commission decisions. Interlocking officers or
directors,2 3 or the management of the operating utility by former officers of
the holding company,24 have been considered relevant. Reports or recom-
mendations passing between a utility and a holding company are similarly
bankers, Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., closely associated with Byllesby in erecting the
Standard System. Both new trustees testified that they expected to receive compensation
from Byllesby. All of the old trustees had been former Byllesby employees or directors.
19. The Commissionohad ruled previously that the burden of proof was on the appli-
cant to bring itself within the exemption requirement. SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.,
95 F. (2d) 699, 701 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). See also, Houston Natural Gas Corp, 3 S. E.
C. 664, 669 (1938).
20. Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941). Another
important case, that of the Public Service Corporation of New Jersey, involving a Com-
mission decision on § 2(a) (8), is presently before the courts. Holding Company Act
Release No. 2998, Sept. 15, 1941. Appeal filed with Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
N. Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1941, p. 34, col. 1.
The Commission denied the petition of Public Service, itself a holding comupany, to
be declared not a subsidiary of United Gas Improvement Co., holding 28.4% of all voting
securities of PSNJ, and United Corporation, holding 13.9%. UGI was admittedly a Sub-
sidiary of United, and their combined holdings totalled 42.3%. UGI organized PSNJ and
transferred to it stock in some New Jersey properties held by UGI. From that time
until 1938 the two companies had interlocking officers and directors. Records of voting
at shareholders' meetings showed that the United-UGI block of votes represented in all
cases save one a majority of the total votes cast. UGI and United actively participated
in petitioner's negotiations with the Pennsylvania Railroad, lasting from 1927-30, for a
contract to supply power to Pennsylvania's newly electrified lines. UGI and PSNJ
merged their engineering service companies under circumstances indicating a domination
of PSNJ by UGI. They retained their joint ownership at the time of the decision. These
and other facts seemingly afford strong grounds for supporting the Commission's decision.
21. Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F. (2d) 730, 739 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
22. Manchester Gas Co., 7 S. E. C. 57, 62 (1940); Detroit Edison Co., 7 S. E. C.
968, 969 (1940). See also Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125,
145 (1939).
23. Detroit Edison Co., 7 S. E. C. 968, 971 et seq. (1940).
24. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 2988,
Sept. 11, 1941, at 12.
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significant in showing close relations. 25 Officers of the holding company
may carry on important negotiations with third parties on behalf of the
operating company.20 Sometimes the holding company retains control of
the utility's proxy machinery.2 7 Group purchasing contracts, or contracts
by a holding company to supply service to an operating company, are like-
wise relevant.2s If the holding company buys a major part of the operating
company's output, the latter's economic dependence on the parent company
makes ii likely that the holding company will exercise a controlling influ-
ence.29 The Commission's refusal to grant exemptions in such situations has
proceeded from a recognition that corporate control for purposes of the Act
may depend upon relations more subtle than mere stock ownership.
But if no controlling influence is shown, or if the public interest does not
require regulation under the Act,30 exemptions have been readily granted
by the Commission. Companies no longer actively engaged in any corporate
activity have presented the dearest case for exemptions.31 In other decisions,
although a company owned more than ten percent of the stock of a public
utility, a third company held a larger share and exercised dominant controlF
Where prima fade parent companies were in a process of reorganization
which would eliminate their stock holdings in the utility, exemption has
likewise been granted. 33 The Commission's control over holding companies
has thus been limited to situations where regulation is necessary to effectuate
the purposes of the Act.
In the interpretation of the "affiliate" definition, the Commission's most
important ruling has come in the Da ton Power and Light case.3 In this
25. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 24,3,
Sept. 11, 1941, at 15. But cf. The Bridgeport Gas Light Company, Holding Company
Act Release No. 2440, Dec. 19, 1940, at 2.
26. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2778,
May 28, 1941, at 13.
27. American Gas and Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2749, May
13, 1941, at 17.
28. Paul Smith's Electric Light and Power and Railroad Company, Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 2854, July 1, 1941, at 7; American Gas and Electric Company,
Holding Company Act Release No. 2749, May 13, 1941.
29. Hartford Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2613, March 13, 1941, at S.
See also opinion on rehearing, Hartford Gas Company, Holding Company Act Release
No. 3277, Jan. 21, 1942.
30. West Penn Railways Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 953, Jan.
3, 1938..
31. Reading Gas Co., 7 S. E. C. 755 (1940); Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., I S. E. C.
323 (1936).
32. Lehigh Power Securities Corp., 5 S. E. C. 143 (1939); Allied Chemical & Dye
Corp., 5 S. E. C. 151 (1939). But the Commission has declared a company to be simul-
taneously a subsidiary of three different holding companies. Northern Natural Gas Co.,
5 S. E. C. 228 (1939).
33. Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S. E. C. 672 (193) ; Boise Gas Light & Co!me
Co., 2 S.E.C. 269 (1937).
34. Holding Company Act Release No. 2654, March 28, 1941. See also Consumers
Power Company, 6 S. E. C. 444 (1939) ; West Penn Power Co., 5 S. E. C. 376 (1939);
Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., 5 S. E. C. 865 (1939).
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case are exemplified the subtle relationships which link the great invest-
ment bankers to public utilities.35 By permission of the SEC, an issue
of Dayton's bonds was floated with Morgan Stanley and Co. as managing
underwriters, without prior Commission approval of the underwriting terms.
InI its subsequent decision, the Commission found that an absence of arm's
length bargaining between Dayton and Morgan Stanley was likely, and thus
forbade payment of any underwriting fees by Dayton to Morgan Stanley. 0
Although the rule under which this conclusion was reached has since been
superseded by the requirement of competitive bidding,3 7 this case is still valid
as an illustration of the Commission's interpretation of the "affiliate" criterion.
The "affiliate" relation in this case centered around J. P. Morgan and Co.
For, even after regulatory legislation had brought the divestment of more
formal controls, J. P. Morgan retained influential connections with invest-
35. "Fundamentally, the holding company problem always has been, and still is, as
much a problem of regulating investment bankers as a problem of regulating tile power
industry." H. R. Doc. No. 137, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 6. See SEN. REr. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 333 et seq. H. R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
Hearings before TNEC Pursuant to P.R. 113, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) v. 10, pp. 5, 33,
50, 256, 258, 481 et seq.; THE PROBLEMI OF MAINTAINING ARM'S LENGTI BARGAINING
AND COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS IN THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES OF REGIS-
TERED PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES AND THIR SUnSIDIARIES (SEC Pub. Util.
Div. 1940).
See also Statement of the SEC upon the Promulgation of U-50, accompanying Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 2676, April 7, 1941, at 17, 18, 25; DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY
AND FINANCE (1940) 6; Comment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1071, 1073 et seq.
36. Holding Company Act Release No. 2654, March 28, 1941, at 3, i. 4.
Rule U-12F-2 under which the action was taken provides:
(a) In connection with an issue, sale or acquisition of any security with respect
to which an application or declaration is required by §§ 6, 7, 9, 10 or 12(d), (f), or (g)
of the Act, no underwriter or finder's fee shall be paid to (1) any company in the same
holding company system as the applicant or declarant, or (2) any affiliate of the appli-
cant or declarant, or of a company of which the applicant or declarant is a subsidiary,
or (3) any person who the Commission finds stands in such relation to the declarant or
applicant, or to the person by whom the fee is to be paid, that there is liable to be or to
have been an absence of arm's-length bargaining with respect to the transactions.
Strictly, the Commission in the instant case was interpreting not "affiliate" but
Rule U-12F-2. However, as the Commission pointed out, the section of the Rule under
which the finding was made is substantially the same as 2(a)(11)(D), the flexible
clause in the "affiliate" definition. See Consumers Power Company, 6 S. E. C. 444,
456 (1939).
37. About a week after the Commission handed down its decision in the instant
case, it announced the promulgation of Rule U-50 designed to supplant Rule U-12F-2.
Holding Company Act Release No. 2676, April 7, 1941. U-50 requires competitive bid-
ding in the issuance or sale of securities by registered public utility holding companies
and their subsidiaries.
For an excellent discussion of the reasons for the Commission's action, see State-
ment of the SEC upon the Promulgation of U-50, accompanying Holding Company Act
Release No. 2676, supra. See also Comment, Competitive Bidding in the Sale of Public
Utility Bonds (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1071.
ment bankers and public utility companies. The Banking Act of 193333
forced banks to choose between commercial and investment banking, and
J. P. Morgan terminated its traditional underwriting business. However,
several Morgan partners and numerous employees soon left the firm tu
establish Morgan Stanley & Co., with Harold Stanley as President. The
voting common stock of Morgan Stanley was completely held by its own
officers and directors, but several J. P. Morgan partners owned non-voting
preferred stock which amounted to 35.87o of the total capital stock out-
standing. Although from these facts the Commission found no controlling
influence, it did find that members of the firm of J. P. Morgan had a strong
pecuniary incentive for helping Morgan Stanley to get business.
In order to foster "closer relations among the great public utility systems
in the East,'39 in 1929 J. P. Morgan and Co. cooperated with Bonbright
and Co. in organizing United Corporation, a super-holding-company formed
to hold stock in several utility holding company systemsA0 United soon
extended its holdings by acquiring 25 percent of the common stock of
Columbia Gas and Electric, with the help of Harold Stanley, then a member
of Columbia's board and executive committee.4 1 Columbia owned all the
stock of the Dayton Company. At the time of Dayton's issue of bonds,
United's slightly reduced holdings in Columbia made it prima facie a holding
company over both Columbia and Dayton. But, at the end of 1939, just
before the start of this proceeding, J. P. Morgan's holding of United stock
had decreased to less than one-half of one percent. In deciding that J. P.
\Iorgan still retained a controlling influence over United, the Commission
emphasized Morgan's continued control over United's proxy machinery.
Moreover, United's board of directors was friendly to Morgan,42 and on
several occasions some of them had conferred with a leading Morgan partner
who had been himself formerly a director of United. In addition, other factors
indicated more directly an affiliation between United's utility subsidiaries
and Morgan Stanley. Since its formation, Morgan Stanley had been the
leading underwriter of public issues of bonds or debentures for all United
38. 48 STAT. 165 (1933), 12 U. S. C. §355 (1940).
39. N. Y. Times, January 11, 1929, p. 1, col. 6.
40. For the history of United see Comment (1937) 37 Co. L. REv. 785, 93t; RFLA-
TION OF HOLDING COMPANIES TO OPERATING COUlPANIES, Pt. 5, 715 Ct seq.
41. Prior to 1934, Columbia's financing was handled by Guaranty Ctmpany, whose
president, until he went over to J. P. Morgan, was Harold Stanley. Since Guaranty's
termination of its investment banking business in 1934 as a result of the Banking Act,
Morgan Stanley has led underwriting on Columbia subsidiary bond issues. For the
importance of personal relationships in the investment banking field, see llearings bef ore
TNEC Pursuant to P. R. 113, 75th Cong., "3d Sess. (1933) v. 10, pp. 5, 50, 258.
42. United's board included Howard, president of United almost since its inception,
and two representatives of another holding company system who had participated vitl
J. P. Morgan in formation of Niagara Hudson, a subsidiary of United. One of these,
Carlisle, was made chairman of the board of Niagara at its formation and w%-as elected a
director of United in 1930. The two other menbers of the board were attorneys, one
retained at the time by United and the other from a firm retained by Niagara Hudson.
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utility companies except in three cases, explainable on other grounds.
4a
Moreover, Morgan Stanley's financing of gas and electric utility companies
had been limited to subsidiaries of United, Commonwealth and Southern
which was an affiliate of United, and Consolidated Edison in which United
also held a substantial stock interest. In view of these facts, the Com-
mission held that such an absence of arm's length bargaining between Dayton
and Morgan Stanley was likely, as made it necessary in the public interest
44
that Morgan Stanley be brought within Rule U-12F-2. Thus by this Rule
no underwriting fees could be paid for Dayton's 1940 bond issue. 46 In
making this finding, the Commission expressly stated that it interpreted the
kind of relation connoted by "affiliate" as something less than "controlling
influence".
46
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Com-
mission's decisions as supported by substantial evidence. 47 The court pointed
out that under the "affiliate" definition "there need not be an absence of
arm's length, only a likelihood that there is." Moreover, the court indi-
cated that, under recent decisions of the Supreme Court,48 a great degree of
finality must be accorded to the Commission's interpretations of statutory
definitions such as "affiliate".
Thus the courts have approved the Commission's broad interpretations of
the statutory definitions of "holding company" and "affiliate". In view of
43. In all three cases the issuer of the securities was the Connecticut Light and Power
Company. The Commission felt that the floating of these issues by an underwriter located
in Connecticut, rather than by Morgan Stanley, was explainable in view of the strong
policy expressed in Connecticut statutes of promoting local control. The statute pro-
vides that no foreign holding company shall control or interfere with the operations of
Connecticut utilities.
44. In discussing the requirements of the public interest the Commission pointed
out several conflicts between the underwriter's interest and that of the public in securing
cheap financing for public utilities. Thus, since underwriting profits can only be secured
through floating security issues, it is to the interest of the investment banker to encour-
age multiple issues, which may not be to the best interests of the issuer. Likewise many
investment houses have a predilection for debt financing, which tends to load the
issuer with a burden of fixed charges. In approaching Morgan Stanley, which handle:
almost exclusively bonds and debentures, Dayton apparently had in mind an issue of
either stock or bonds for new money amounting to approximately $5,700,000. In the
discussions Morgan Stanley suggested combining the acquisition of new money with
refunding of about $19,000,000 outstanding 3%%r bonds due in 1960. This was done
by floating the present issue of about $25,000,000 in 3% bonds. The Commission ques-
tioned whether this transaction would have taken place without some sort of prodding.
Holding Company Act Release No. 2654, March 28, 1941, at 20.
45. Compare United Gas Improvement Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 3053,
Oct. 6, 1941.
46. Dayton Power and Light Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 2654,
March 28, 1941, at 22.
47. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. SEC, Ct. of App. for the Second Circuit, Feb.
20, 1942.
48. See Gray v. Powell, 62 Sup. Ct. 326, 333 (U. S. 1941). Cf. Helvering v. Tex-
Penn Oil Co., 300 U. S. 481, 491 (1937).
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the subtle and varied manifestations of modern corporate control, such a
course seems the only one capable of effectuating the purposes of the Act.40
PUBLIC UTILITY RATE REGULATION: THE END OF THE RULE
OF SMYTH v. AMES*
FOR more than forty years one of the knottiest and most discussed problems
in utility rate regulation has been that of rate base determination in the light
of the judicial requirements laid down in Smyth v. Ames.1 This leading case
climaxed a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court, abandoning its
refusal to take part in rate regulation, held that rate reasonableness and rate
base determination were judicial questions.2 Looking to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court in Smyth v. Ames ruled that no state could establish
confiscatory rates and that a rate would be deemed confiscatory if it did not
allow the utility to earn "a fair return upon the fair value"' of its property
used and useful in the public service. Among the "matters for consideration" 4
in determining the rate base, Mr. justice Harlan listed original cost and
49. Compare Comment (1941) 40 Ifici. L. REv. 274, 284, and the Supreme Court's
emasculation of the commodities clause of the Hepburn Act, United States v. Delaware
& Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (1909). The term "control" standing alone does not have
a definite connotation, but must be interpreted in the light of the purposes to be achieved.
Thus control is defined in certain parts of the income tax law for purposes of determin-
ing capital loss or gain as eighty percent of the total combined voting power of the voting
stock of a company. Ix. RE . CODE § 112(h) (194(I). Nor is the Commission free to
exercise an unfettered discretion. "However, this part tif the present Act [§2(a) (8)1
has its guide post, which prevents the Commission from exercising arbitrary power in
enforcing it." Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F. (2d) 730, 739 (C. C. A. 6th, 1041).
* Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 731, (U. S.
1942).
1. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
2. Although the Court held in funn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113. 134 (187oh, that "for
protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the
courts," it declared fourteen years later that "the question of the reasunableness of a
rate of charge . . . is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due
process of law for its determination." Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S.
418, 45S (1890). For an historical survey of early regulation by franchie and commis-
sion, see JONES AND BIGHAM, PIUNCIPL.ES OF PBtnIC U'rILITIES (1931) 102, 157 rt seq.
3. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 546-47 (1898).
4. These "matters" are: original cost of construction, amount expended in pvr-
manent improvements, amount and market value of londs and stock, present as com-
pared with original cost of construction, probable earning capacity of the property
under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum retluired to meet operating
expenses: They are to be given "such weight as may be just and right in each case."
Ibid.
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reproduction cost,5 the latter of which has been held in nearly all subsequent
decisions to be an essential valuation factor.0 These later holdings have been
severely criticized, 7 particularly by proponents of a modification of original
cost-prudent investment value.8  Foreshadowing resolution of the long
conflict between these competing methods of valuation, a recent Supreme
Court case9 suggests the necessity of reappraising the validity and status
of the Smyth v. Ames rule.10
As critics of the Ames decision were quick to point out, the fair-value
concept itself involved a fundamental circularity in reasoning." It postulated
a fair return upon the fair value of a property for which there was no mar-
ket, and whose value was largely determined by what it could earn. This
circularity derived from the Court's misappropriation of the fair-value doc-
trine from the law of eminent domain,' 2 which requires that compensation
for condemned property leave the property owner in the same position
pecuniarily that he was in prior to the condemnation. 13 It is apparent that
a concept of fair-value drawn from this field is completely inapplicable to
rate-making, where the value of the property to the owners varies with every
change in the utility rate.
Besides the inherent defects of the fair-value rule, use of reproduction-
cost as a measure of fair-value is administratively burdensome. Since both
tangibles and intangibles necessary to plant-replacement must be included
5. The reproduction cost method seeks to determine the cost of the identical
properties, and not an equally efficient substitute, if they were to be replaced as of
the time of the rate inquiry. See BAUER AND GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION (1934)
155-72.
6. See cases cited infra notes 25, 28.
7. BAUER AND GOLD, Op. cit. supra note 5, 371-445; 2 BoNDRIGHT, VALUATION or
PROPERTY (1937) 1154-56; Richberg, A Permanent Basis for Rate Regulation (1922)
31 YALE L. J. 263; Booth, Prudent Investment, Fair Value, and Public Utility Regulation
(1938) 1 NAT. LAWYFRS' GUILD Q. 229; Kauper, Wanted: A New Definition of the Rate
Base (1939) 37 MIcH. L. REV. 1209 and references cited therein.
8. Although it admits of many variations, the prudent investment method generally
purports to ascertain the amount of capital judiciously invested originally in an enter-
prise plus increases for permanent plant additions. See 2 BONDRIGIT, Op. Cit. supra
note 7, 1084-86.
9. Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 736 (U. S. 1942).
10. As it has been popularly understood, the "rule of Smyth v. Aines" makes essen-
tial the consideration of reproduction cost in the rate base determination.
11. See Hale, The "Fair-Value" Merry-Go-Round (1939) 33 ILL. L, R'v. 517.
"'Fair value' must be shelved among the great juristic myths of history, with the Law
of Nature and the Social Contract. As a practical concept, from which practical con-
clusions can be drawn, it is valueless." Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts
(1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 1031, 1051.
12. See Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases (1921) 30 YALE L. 3.
710. See further, 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 1094-98; Hale, Con-
flicting Judicial Criteria of Utility Rates (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 959, 960-64.
13. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 343 (1923); ef.
Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 328-29 (1893).
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in an engineering inventory, 14 conclusions reached by the reproduction-cost
method are necessarily speculative and generally unreliable.Y As a result,
the length and expense10 of rate litigation are notorious, and may be said,
ironically, to feed upon themselves -since valuation by the reproduction-
cost method becomes obsolete with any change in the price level as of the
time of the inquiry.17 Although the method is strongly urged by the utilities
during periods of high prices,' it is temporarily neglected, sometimes
14. In evaluating property under the rule of Smyth v. Ames, the Court has held
that the following items, intcr alia. must be included in the rate base: (1) Tonqil, e:
land and structures [Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178 (1918)1; labor
[McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926)]. (2) Inlanfible: depre-
ciation and amortization [Knoxville v. Moxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 (lQD9)1:
going-concern value [McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra at 414]. But cf.
note 33 infra. See 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 1118-51. The follow-
ing items, inter alia, have been excluded as evidence of fair-value: franchises and
good will [Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 669 (1912)1;
past losses [Galveston Elect. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 38S (1922)]. Conversely,
past exorbitant profits do not justify present or future rates that are confiscatory
[Newton v. Consol. Gas. Co., 258 U. S. 165 (1922)]. On the admission or exclusion of
any of these elements, the party contesting a Commission order has the burden of
proof [Railroad Comm. v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 212 U. S. 414 (1909)].
15. "A plant valuation which simply represents a hypothetical cost of reproduction
at a particular time is obviously a purely theoretical valuation. It does not correspond
with anything which has actual existence in the world of industry and business:'
Re Springfield Consol. Ry., P.U.R. 1920E, 474, 480 (I1.). See NEw Yoni, Comr-
mISSION ON REVIsION OF PUBLIC SERVICE C0MIssIo0x Ltw, MIoRITY Rupik'r (1930)
250 et seq.
16. Perhaps the most outrageous example of the prodigious cost and length of
fair-value litigation is the attempt made by the ICC to appraise Class I railroads under
the Valuation Act of 1913. Expenditures: $178,000,000; time spent: 18 years. Pro-
ceedings were suspended in 1931 when depression prices made earlier valuations useleqs.
Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foregn Commerce on 11. R. 7116, 7117,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 322.
17. "The most serious vice of the present rule [fair-value] for fixing the rate ba3e
is not the existing uncertainty; but that the method does not lead to certainty."
Brandeis, J., dissenting in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262
U. S. 276, 306-08 (1923). A possible explanation of this perpetual lack of finality is
that fair-value connotes a market value which does not exist; fair-value is "not ex-
change value" but "a special value for rate-making purposes." Brandeis, J., dissenting
in the Southwestern Bell Telephone case, supra at 292, 310. Neither can fair-value be
used as assessment value for taxation purposes; nor vice versa. 2 BomNminIT, VrALUA-
TION OF PROPERTY (1937) 1100-02.
18. After McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926), decided at
the height of post-war prosperity, it seemed as if the Court had made reproductic-n
cost not an, but the, essential element in determining fair-value. But cf. Los Angeles
Gas & Elect. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 289 U. S. 287, 311-12 (1933), decided durinig
the depths of the depression, where the Court accepted original cost as a measure of
value because reproduction cost estimates as of 1929-30 afforded "no secure foundation
for prediction of future values".
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completely condemned,19 by them when market value declines. Thus, besides
providing a shifting rate base, reproduction-cost tends to place the burden
of reckless investment and overcapitalization upon the consumer, thereby
forcing him to pay the investor high profits during periods of high prices,
while not guaranteeing to the consumer proportionate reductions during
periods of falling prices.
20
Of the several compromise methods 2 of fixing the rate base, prudent
investment has received most support. Arguing that the Constitution requires
a fair return on the utility's property investment, and not on the property's
present fair-value,2 2 the proponents of prudent investment see their method
as a means of (1) eliminating the logical objection of circularity; (2) avoid-
ing periodic reappraisals of property with each change in the price level;
(3) reducing the speculative character of utility investments by providing
an objective standard of valuation, which in turn will remove the gamble
on future property valuations, thereby allowing lower rates; and (4) easing
the commission's regulatory task by making unnecessary the valuation of
those intangibles included in the reproduction-cost appraisal.2 3 On the other
hand, reproduction cost adherents enter the caveat 2 4 that prudent invest-
ment will (1) result in a continued exaction of high rates from consumers
on investments made during periods of high prices and inflated value, and
19. When Smyth v. Ames reached the Court in 1898, prices were at their lowest
level since the Panic of 1893. GLAESER, OUTLINES OF PUBLIC UTILITY EcoNomtics (1931)
458 (chart). Accordingly, the railroads, which had been built during days of higher
prices, urged the Court to adopt the original cost method of property valuation. The
State of Nebraska, on the other hand, asked the Court to adopt the reproduction cost
method as a protection against the railroads' claims, based on past inflated prices.
But when, just before and during the first World War, the price level rose, the
utilities and commissions reversed their arguments. See BAUER AND GOLD, PUBLIC
UTILITY VALUATION (1934) 49-112.
20. Black, J., dissenting in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419,
431 (1938), pointed out that in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400
(1926), the Company was held entitled to a rate based on a $19,000,000 valuation
although its total investment was $9,000,000. Cf. BAUER, EFFrcErvE REGULATION o
PUBLIC UTILITIES (1925) 111-14, where the author maintains that "strict adherence
to reproduction cost over a long period of falling prices would bring insolvency and
financial collapse" to the utility. The inequalities of price movements among different
elements of the rate base further complicates the problem. Re-determination of the
rate base by index-numbers is therefore a highly impractical operation. See Lilienthal,
Regulation of Public Utilities During the Depression (1933) 46 HARV. L. R'v. 745,
748 (graph).
21. See, inter alia, the "split-inventory" and "index-number" methods discussed
in 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 1089-92.
22. Brandeis, J., dissenting in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
262 U. S. 276, 290 (1923). But see contra, Brown, The Defects in Mr. Justice Brandeis'
Theory of Prudent Investment as a Rate Base (1924) 12 CALIF. L. REv. 283-96.
23. See note 14 supra.
24. See Fed. Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 736 (U. S. 1942),
Reply Brief for Cross-Petitioner, pp. 93-96; Dorety, The Function of Reproduction
Cost in Public Utility Valuation and Rate-Making (1923) 37 HARv. L. Rw. 173.
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(2) destroy management's incentive to reduce original cost. Used with
great success by several state commissions,2e urged for adoption by others,20
the method of prudent investment received its greatest support in a memor-
able dissent of Mr. justice Brandeis,- and has subsequently been impliedly
approved by the Supreme Court at least four times.
28
In the instant case,20 acting under the Natural Gas Act" on complaint
of the Illinois Commerce Commission, the Federal Power Commission in-
vestigated rates for gas sold at wholesale by the Natural Gas Pipeline Com-
pany of America and the Texoma Natural Gas Company and found them
excessive. For purposes of its interim order, the FPC "reluctantly" accepted
the companies' estimates as to the reproduction cost new of the physical
properties but refused to include in the rate base a separate allowance for
going-concern value. Upon the rate base thus set, the FPC fixed a 6gf '
return, and thereupon ordered the companies to reduce rates sufficiently to
bring their income rate down to this figure, a reduction of approximately
thirty percent in operating revenues.31 On appeal to the Supreme Court
from a decision in the companies' favor below,32 it was held that where the
rate base is determined by the cost of reproduction new, a separate sum for
going-concern value does not have to be included.m More important, how-
ever, than the specific holdings of the decision 34 is its total effect which, by
25. California, Massachusetts and Wisconsin took the lead in adopting the prudent
investment principle. To the knowledge of the writer, no Massachusetts or Wisconsin
case dealing With methods of rate-base determination has ever been reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court; the California Commission's use of original cost was
upheld in Los Angeles Gas & Elect. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 289 U. S. 287 (1933) and
in Railroad Comm. v. Pac. Gas & Elect. Co., 302 U. S. 388 (1938). See Bm.nxs, Pun-
LIC UTILITY CONTROL IN MAssAcHUSETIS (1930) ,assim; Goldberg, The Massachusetts
Proposals for Public Control (1931) 11 B. U. L. REV. 54; Milvaukee Elect. Ry. &
Light Co. v. Milwaukee, P. U. R. 1918E, 1, 23 (Wis.).
26. See NEW YORK CoMMaISSIOx o2 REVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CoMIIiSSION
LAW, MNoRIY REPORT (1930) passim.
27. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 276, 290 (1923).
28. See cases cited supra note 25; also, Lindheimer v. Ill. Bell. Tel. Co., 292 U. S.
151 (1934) and Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 292 U. S. 290 (1934).
Note that these four decisions were handed down at the nadir of the depression; in this
connection, see notes 18-20 supra. See Hale, The rzo Supreme Court Test of Confisca-
tory Rates (1934) 10 J. LAND AND P. U. Eco.z. 307. But ef. West v. Chesapeake & Pot.
Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662 (1935), which belied any expectations that the fair-value rule
would be rejected.
29. Fed. Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 736 (U. S. 1942).
30. 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717 (1940).
31. Fed. Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 736 (U. S. 1942),
Brief for Petitioner, p. 41, n. 10.
32. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Power Comm., 120 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A.
7th, 1941).
33. Fed. Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. CL 736, 744-45 (U. S.
1942).
34. Natural Gas Act held constitutional; FPC's interim order directing companies to
file decreased rate schedule held valid; period of amortization can be fixed as of the
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narrowing the scope of judicial review, appears greatly to broaden the dis-
cretionary rate-making powers heretofore held by regulatory agencies.
Although the FPC's request that Smyth v. Ames be specifically over-
ruled 35 was ignored by the Court, possibly for procedural reasons,3 0 Chief
Justice Stone declared that "the Constitution does not bind rate-making
bodies to the service of any single formula or combination of formulas." The
majority held that if the statutory requirements of a fair hearing had been
met and no arbitrary result reached, the Court's "inquiry is at an end."5 7
Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., concurring with the Court's judgment,
interpreted it as erasing "much which has been written in rate cases during
the past half century" 38 and as freeing commissions from the compulsion
of admitting evidence on reproduction cost or of giving weight to the element
of fair-value. "The Commission may now adopt, if it chooses, prudent in-
vestment as a rate base."
3 9
The concurring justices, however, went even further. Whereas the Chief
Justice, equating the Natural Gas Act standard of "reasonable" with the
constitutional standard of "not confiscatory", maintained that the Court
can here intervene when "the limits of due process have been overstepped",
40
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy advanced the conception of due process
that would take from the Court the power to inquire into the substantive
merits of a rate or rate base. "That judgment has been entrusted to the
Commission. There it should rest."
' 41
Underlying the concurring justices' opinion is the premise that rate-fixing
is a species of price-fixing 42 and that the substantive merits of the price set,
under the Nebbia rule,43 is not a question for judicial cognizance. If this
reasoning were to be adopted by the Court, judicial review by federal courts in
entire life of the enterprise; amortization interest rate and rate of return held fair as
"supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 741-49.
35. Id., Brief for Petitioner, pp. 112-33.
36. According to a long-standing rule of appellate procedure, matter not raised in
the trial courts-with few exceptions-will not be considered on appeal. See Note (1941)
50 YALE L. J. 1460. The request that Smyth v. Ames be overruled was not made in any
of the proceedings below.
37. Fed. Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Sup. Ct. 736, 743 (U. S.
1942).
38. Id. at 750.
39. Id. at 752.
40. Id. at 743. Cf. Brandeis, J., and Stone, J., concurring in St. Joseph Stock Yards
v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 73, 93 (1936).
41. Fed. Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., at 753.
42. Id. at 749. Fixing maximum prices for an industry is probably on the constitu-
tional side of the line between a "regulation" and a "taking of property." Comment (1942)
51 YALE L. J. 835-36, n. 76.
43. In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934), the Court, in upholding a state
statute authorizing a milk control board to fix minimum and maximum retail prices for
milk, said, at 525, "The guaranty of due process . . . demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." See also Fed. Power
Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., at 749, n. 1.
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state rate cases might well be limited to procedural due process. In the light of
the Court's recent action in the Rowan and Nichols cases,"4 such an elimina-
tion of substantive due process from the Court's "special competence", 45
strongly urged by the concurring justices in the instant case, 0 may not he
an unlikely development, and may possibly mean the Court's return to its
position in Munn v. Illinois.47  In view of the degree of finality accorded
by the Court to administrative bodies in tax, tariff, and condemnation pro-
ceedings,48 a return to judicial self-abnegation in rate proceedings would
not be without precedent.
For the much criticized rule of Smyth v. Anes,4 the Natural Gas case
has substituted the doctrine that rate-making bodies "are free, within the
ambit of their statutory authority", to choose any formula in ascertaining
fair value or fair return, provided that a fair hearing is given and no arbi-
trary result is obtained.5 0 If this means elimination of the problems insep-
arable from strict adherence to reproduction-cost, more effective and more
economical regulation of utility rates should result.51
44. Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940),
amended, 311 U. S. 614 (1940); id., 311 U. S. 570 (1941). Here Frankfurter, J., ex-
pressly disapproved the lower courts' inquiries into the reasonableness of state regulation
of business. It appeared from these cases that the Supreme Court was limiting due pro-
cess to its procedural aspects and that the Fourteenth Amendment was being abandoned
as a check on the merits of state regulation of business. See Note, Federal Cmirt
Review of State Regulation of Business (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 6S0. In the instant case
Frankfurter, J., concurring with the Chief Justice, stated that the constitutional ques-
tion was not in issue. Presumably this was because the majority did not base its re'iew
directly on the Constitution but rather interpreted the statutory standard of "reasonable"
in the light of past decisions holding that the lowest reasonable rate was one not confis-
catory in the constitutional sense. In effect the majority then adopted the principle of
stare decisis on the issue of the proper construction of "reasonable." The concurring jus-
tices, on the other hand, would reject these prior interpretations because they applied a
concept of substantive "due process."
45. There is increasing evidence to the effect that substantive due process is being
judicially exiled except in the fields of civil liberties and criminal procedure. See JAcn-
sox, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMAI"Y (1941) 283-85; Hamilton and Braden, The
Special Competence of the Supreme Court (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1319, 1349-57; Fed.
Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.. at 750, n. 4.
46. Fed. Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., at 749. But cf. p. 753, where
the concurring justices enter the caveat that, in determining reasonable rates, "the con-
sumer interest cannot be disregarded."
47. See note 2 supra. Contra: Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 2_53
U. S. 287 (1920); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). It seens likely that the
force of the Ben Avon and Crow'ell decisions, limiting the freedom of administrative
agencies, has been greatly weakened by the instant case. See Hardman, Judicial Rcqeiw
as a Requirement of Due Process in Rate Regulation (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 681.
48. Brandeis, J., concurring in St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 293 U. S.
38, 78-80 (1936).
49. See notes 7 and 10 supra.
50. Stone, C. J., in Fed. Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., at 743.
51. See Comment, Has Gozernment Regulation of Utilities Proven a Failure? (19311)
6 IND. L. J. 111.
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FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION OF MAJORITY STOCKHOLDERS*
THE standards judicially imposed on directors and dominant stockholders
in dealing with their corporations have traditionally been phrased in terms
analogous to those which describe the duties of a trustee toward his cestui
que trust.' This concept has not, however, noticeably influenced the course
of decision. The courts have employed language which recognizes marked
social benefits to be derived from the imposition of a strict fiduciary standard,
2
but the ideal of flexibility and a wise discretion in management has been
an effective counterweight to the announced readiness to submit corporate
action to judicial review.3
The recent decision of the New York Appellate Division in Blaustein v.
Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company 4 illustrates this reluctance
on the part of the courts to substitute their business judgment for that of
directors and dominant stockholders. In 1933 the Blausteins, owners of a
retail organization for marketing oil products, were wholly dependent upon
Pan American for their supply of gasoline. But Pan American's main sources
of petroleum were located abroad, and in anticipation of a federal embargo
on imported oil it planned the sale of its crude producing properties to the
Standard Oil Company (N.J.). Faced with loss of their gasoline supply,
the Blausteins purchased stock in Pan American and threatened to block
the pending transaction. The dispute was terminated when Standard Oil
of Indiana, which owned ninety-six percent of Pan American stock, and the
Blausteins entered into a "definitive agreement", the express purpose of which
was to make Pan American an integrated oil company. By its terms the
Blausteins received approximately twenty percent of Pan American stock,
with the option to resell it to Indiana at a stated price in the event of man-
agement disagreement, and the power to appoint three of nine directors,
In addition, the agreement provided for the immediate allocation of Pan
American funds to acquire crude oil producing properties and for the con-
struction of a refinery of specified capacity.5
The failure of Indiana to comply with the agreement and its refusal to
authorize establishment of a pipe line and a crude purchasing department
essential to the integration of Pan American caused the Blausteins to insti-
* Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N. Y.
S. (2d) 934 (1st Dep't 1941), rev'g 174 Misc. 601, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 651 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
(hereinafter cited as Blaustein v. Pan American Co.).
1. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483 (1919); Kavanaugh v,
Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148 (1919) ; Bosworth v. Allen, 18
N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163 (1901); 3 FLErcHER, Cyc. CORP. (perm. ed. 1931) §838; 13 id.
§ 5811; Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors (1939) 19 B. U. L. Rv. 12.
2. See Hymans v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529, 537 (C. C. A. 6th,
1915); Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 834, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253, 259 (1st Dep't
1912), aff'd, 215 N. Y. 634, 109 N. E. 1068 (1915).
3. See Rohrlich, The New Deal in Corporation Law (1935)"35 COL. L. R -v. 1167,
1178.
4. Blaustein v. Pan American Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934 (1st
Dep't 1941).
5. Id. at 100 et seq., 31 N. Y. S. (2d) at 940 et seq.
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tute a derivative stockholder's suit charging Indiana with violation of its
fiduciary duties. Uncertainty whether New York courts will enforce share-
holder's contracts which substantially deprive directors of their independent
business judgment,6 undoubtedly influenced the plaintiffs not to bring suit
for breach of the "definitive agreement." But the contract was introduced in
evidence to outline the obligations imposed upon Indiana by the contemplated
reorganization of Pan American.
7
In reversing the decision of the trial court for the plaintiffs, the Appellate
Division held that nonfulfillment of the agreement was consonant with sound
business policies and thus constituted no breach of the good faith and dili-
gence required of a dominant stockholder. The delay in acquiring crude
producing properties was found proper since the directors believed that the
Texas antitrust laws made it illegal for Pan American to engage in Te:.,as
production when another wholly-owned Indiana subsidiary had already
entered the field. Moreover, the court concluded that the directors properly
relied upon the inaccurate s opinion of Indiana's general counsel, concurred
in by Pan American and Texas lawyers, in view of the confused state of
Texas law and the attorney's good faith. The evidence also indicated that
the Blausteins had been apprised of this difficulty before the reorganization
of Pan American was undertaken. These factors, together with the severity
of the penalties prescribed for violation of the Texas statutes, were said
to have merited deferring the organization of a Pan American production
subsidiary until the directors were convinced of its legality.P The Appellate
Division also decided that the action of the directors in purchasing crude
oil and in leasing pipe lines from Indiana subsidiaries instead of establishing
independent Pan American enterprises was justified by the uncertainty of
economic conditions. The petroleum industry was harassed both by the
general business depression and by vast overproduction which made expan-
sion hazardous. Not only were the purchasing and pipe line contracts found
to be reasonable in themselves; they were needed to guarantee to Pan
American a dependable supply of crude oil. It was conceded that successful
operation of a Pan American pipe line depended upon obtaining oil well
connections in the East Texas field. But the court ruled that adequate con-
nections could not have been procured since most of the wells were con-
trolled by major companies unwilling to sell in view of an impending reduc-
tion of the legally allowable crude limit.10 The Appellate Division approved
the finding of the trial court that technological and economic problems in
the industry warranted construction of a smaller refinery. The appellate
6. See McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 33, 189 N. E. 234 (1934); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918). But cf. Miller v. Vanderlip, 235 N. Y.
116, 33 N. E. (2d) 51 (1941) ; Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936).
7. Blaustein v. Pan American Co., 174 Misc. 601, 621, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 651, 674
(Sup. Ct 1940).
8. On the basis of subsequent advice from Texas counsel, Pan American later or-
ganized a production subsidiary in Texas which has not fallen afoul of the antitrust laws.
9. Blaustein v. Pan American Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 114 et seq., 31 N. Y. S. (2d)
934, 952 et seq. (Sup. Ct. 1940).
10. Id. at 106 et seq., 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 945 et scq.
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court, however, stated that this justification of Indiana's conduct was ml-
necessary, since its position as majority stockholder and the existence of
interlocking directorates did not evidence sufficient domination of the sub-
sidiary to warrant the imposition of fiduciary obligations upon the parent
corporation.'"
The trial court, on the other hand, ruled that Indiana had dominated Pan
American and had prevented its integration for the purpose of diverting
profits to other Indiana subsidiaries. Thus, delay in authorizing Pan
American's acquisition of crude properties was held to have been designed
primarily to expedite Indiana's purchasing program rather than to avoid
violation of the Texas antitrust laws. This conclusion was based in part
on a finding that the possibility of conflict with Texas law had been con-
cealed from the Blausteins before the reorganization of Pan American was
undertaken, and on a reversal of opinion by Indiana's general counsel after
having been assured of the legality of the venture by a Texas lawyer. The
court also found that the directors had failed to consider the opinion of Pan
American's attorneys and to seek immediate advice from experts in Texas
law. Furthermore, the supposed legal difficulties might have been circum-
vented by purchasing suitable property in Louisiana. The finding that a
large part of the oil produced from the Indiana wells acquired during this
period was later resold to Pan American at a profit was taken as further
confirmation of an intent to divert profits to Indiana.1
2
Nor was the trial court persuaded that evidence concerning available oil
well connections warranted the directors' decision not to construct a pipe
line which would have saved Pan American a million dollars annually. The
independent ownership of fifty percent of the East Texas wells supported
the court's conclusion that adequate connections could have been procured.
Moreover, numerous connections had become available because of the over-
production of oil, as shown by the fact that another company had success-
fully conducted a program similar to that contemplated by Pan American.
Lacking facilities of its own, Pan American was compelled to negotiate con-
tracts with Indiana subsidiaries, enabling the latter to renew expiring pipe
line leases and to sell at posted prices crude oil which had been purchased
on a "distress" market and stored. For these reasons, Indiana was ordered
to account for the profits obtained by denying Pan American the opportunity
to acquire such profits for itself.13
In addition to their disagreement on the facts, the two courts also differed
in their application of the law. The Appellate Division determined the
legality of Indiana's actions by the prevailing standards governing the con-
duct of dominant stockholders. A majority of courts have adopted the rule
that transactions in which dominant stockholders have a personal interest
11. Id. at 119-25, 31 N.Y. S. (2d) at 956-62. See also Gamble v. Queens County
Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 201 (1890) ; 13 FLETCuER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5829;
Rohrlich, Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders As a Means of Corporate Control
(1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 692.
12. Blaustein v. Pan American Co., 174 Misc. 601, 630 ct scq., 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 651,
682 et scq.
13. Id. at 640 ct scq., 21 N. Y. S. (2d) at 690 et seq.
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cannot be challenged unless clearly intended to divest the minority of their
property rights.14 A market place standard of fairness and good faith rather
than the receipt of personal gain from the fiduciary relationship is the
criterion by which the validity of such transactions is judged}Y Normally
courts will also permit directors to engage in a competing business or other-
wise acquire interests adverse to those of their corporation ;1o it is only when
a director represents both the corporation and himself that the transactions
are voidable at the option of the shareholders,' 7 without regard to fairness
and good faith.' 8 Despite repeated admonitions that contracts in which
directors are adversely interested will be set aside if the slightest irregularity
appears, 9 courts seldom interfere without clear evidence of undue prejudice
to the corporation. Stressing these established principles, the Appellate
Division disregarded the conflicting interests of the directors and emphasized
the fact that Pan American prospered under Indiana's control. -0 And since
the trial court had affirmed the fairness of the transactions and the good faith
of the directors, the appellate court found no breach of fiduciary duties.
The decision below proceeded upon a direct application of the trust con-
cepts to which the opinions have so frequently paid lip-service. The court relied
heavily upon cases which state the rule of undivided loyalty governing the con-
duct of formal trustees,2 ' and the corollary that the fairness of a transaction
is immaterial once a conflict between self-interest and fiduciary duty has
been established 2 Reliance was also placed on cases applying these tests
14. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elect. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (C. C. A. Sth, 1906); Erin
v. Oregon Ry. & Navig. Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) ; Slmaw v. Davis, 78
Md. 308, 28 AtI. 619 (1894). Contra: Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., 159
Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908) (fairness of price immaterial); Pearson v. Concord R. R.,
62 N. H. 537 (1883) (fairness of contract immaterial).
15. See International Radio Telegraph Co. v. Atlantic Communication Co., 290 Fed.
698, 702 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) ; Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del.
Ch. 1, 18, 120 AUt. 486, 493 (1923).
16. See Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 5W7 (1875); Barr v. Pittsburgh
Plate-Glass Co., 57 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 3d, 1893); Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345,
211 Pac. 370 (1922); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn. 277,
156 N. NV. 255 (1916). See Comment (1939) 39 CoL L. REa. 219, ,224.
17. The cases are collected in BALrANuTINTE, MANUAL OF ConronATiuoN LAw A-D
PRAcncE (1930) § 123.
18. See Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 490, 113 So. 516, 520 (1927); Tenison
v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 292, 67 S. NV. 92, 94 (1902) ; 3 FLETcumE, op. d. supra note 1,
§926.
19. See Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 599 (1920); TVin-Lick
Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587, 58S (1875).
20. Between 1933 and 1939 Pan American consolidated assets increased nearly
$;25,000,000 and its earning schedule increased from a net loss of nearly $1,500,000 to a
net profit of more than $5,000,000. Blaustein v. Pan American Co., 263 App. Div. 97,
130, 31 N.Y.S. (2d) 934, 966 (1st Dep't 1941).
21. Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503 (1846); 'Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164
N. E. 545 (1928). See 3 BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRusrEs (1935) § 543.
22. Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586 (1921); McGruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106
(1914) ; Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1926).
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in disqualifying directors from entering into transactions in which they
have a personal interest.23 Thus, while the fairness and good faith of
Indiana's actions were conceded, the court nevertheless held that the direc-
tor's adverse interests had led to unwarranted diversion of profits from
Pan American.
The respective positions of the courts are sharply contrasted in their
decisions on the validity of Indiana's acquisition of crude properties to the
exclusion of Pan American. The trial court imposed a constructive trust
on the property in favor of Pan American, but this action was reversed by
the appellate court. In deciding this issue, both courts spoke in terms of
the corporate opportunity doctrine, which forbids a corporate fiduciary to
preempt an opportunity in which his corporation has a precise and definite
interest.24 The Appellate Division, strictly construing the doctrine, held that
Pan American's interest in the crude properties was too vague and indefinite
to come within the rule. The court stated that it was never "proposed that
Pan American purchase any of the properties" and that Indiana's action was
merely "the negative one of postponing activity in crude production."2 05
No weight was given to the conflict of interest implicit in the dual role of
Indiana as dominant stockholder and as competitor. The lower court, on
the other hand, stressed Indiana's profitable acquisition of crude properties
to the detriment of Pan American rather than the latter's actual or expectant
interest in the property. This position, which is concerned primarily with
enforcing a duty of undivided loyalty on the part of corporate fiduciaries, is
consistent with the recent judicial trend.
26
It cannot be hoped that the application of the ambiguous standards of
"fairness" and "good faith" will lead to a satisfactory solution of the complex
fact situations presented in modern corporate litigation. Particularly in view
of the irresponsibility of controlling groups, a prophylactic rule which im-
poses liability without regard to the tests of "fairness" and "good faith"
seems necessary. The recent case of Overficld v. Pennroad Corporation2 7
suggests the potentialities of such a rule. In that case, the Pennsylvania
Railroad organized and operated the Pennroad Corporation as an independent
agency for the purpose of gaining control over certain railroads, As a
result of this domination, secured by means of interlocking directorates and
voting trusts, Pennroad's investments were used to further Pennsylvania's
program of expansion rather than to benefit its own stockholders. Although
23. U. S. Steel Corp v. Hodge, 64 N. J. Eq. 807, 54 At. 1 (1903) ; Munson v. Syra-
cuse, 103 N.Y. 59, 8 N. E. 355 (1886). See 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 930.
24. For an extensive discussion of the corporate opportunity doctrine see Fuller,
Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal Business Activities of
Directors (1941) 26 WAsH. U. L. Q. 189. See Note (1939) 39 COL. L. R v. 219.
25. Blaustein v. Pan American Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 127, 31 N.Y. S. (2d) 934,
963 (1st Dep't 1941).
26. See Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 Fed. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), (1935)
44 Ytmn L. J. 527; Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586 (E. D. Pa. 1941);
Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 172 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 897, 26
N. Y. S. (2d) 320 (1st Dep't 1940) ; Guth v. Loft, 5 Ati. (2d) 503 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1939).
27. 42 F. Supp. 586 (E. D. Pa. 1941).
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the directors offered evidence to prove their good faith and the fairness of
their conduct, the court held that their conflicting interests prevented ful-
fillment of their fiduciary obligations.
The feasibility of effective application of the fiduciary concept to corporate
management in favor of unknown shareholders is questionable. -3 The efficacy
of the concept is further weakened by the grave deficiencies inherent in the
derivative stockholder's suit as the only instrument of enforcement 9 But,
if minority interests are to be protected. courts must, until more adequate
restraints can be devised, give full effect to available controls, however wealc
they may be.
JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON PEACEFUL PICKETING BY
"NON-LABOR" GROUPS
To protect activities of labor from excessive judicial interference, state,
and federal2 statutes curb the use of injunctions in "labor disputes". Narrow
judicial copstruction 3 of this limiting phrase in the statutes has subjected
unions not only to prosecution under the antitrust laws but, as well, to
injunctions which issue almost automatically 4 when no labor dispute is fomd
to exist. Consequently the question arises to what extent the constitutional
immunity recently extended to peaceful picketing5 restores to unions the
freedom of action they have lost by narrow judicial interpretation of the
anti-injunction laws. On this point a recent New York Supreme Court
case' raises further questions whether the protection accorded activities of
labor unions should be extended to the activities of groups of "independents"
resembling labor unions.
In this case the parties to the dispute were seven New York newspaper
publishers and a union of newsdealers which bought papers from the pub-
lishers and resold them to the public. Claiming that the terms of the sales
contract were unjust, the union refused to continue selling the papers and
picketed non-member newsdealers who would not join in the boycott. The
State Attorney-General brought action for a temporary injunction, alleging
28. See Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
fanagers Practicablef (1935) 2 U. oF CHL L. REV. 194.
29. See Berlack, Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute (1937) 35 Mrcn.
L. REv. 597.
* People v. Masiello, 177 Misc. 608, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 512 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
1. See Smith and De Lancey, The State Legislatures and Unionism (1940) 38 MICH.
L. REv. 987, 1013 et seq.
2. Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 ST.T. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-15 (1940). For
a concise statement of the Act see 1 TELLERa, LAEOR DisrUs Am COLLECThi BAuGAII.-
ING (1940) § 200.
3. See Galenson and Spector, The reo York Labor-Injunction Statute and the
Courts (1942) 42 CoL L. REv. 51; Comment (1940) 49 YLE L. J. 537.
4. See Feinberg, Picketing, Free Speech and Labor Disputes (1940) 17 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rsv. 385, 388.
5. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
6. People v. Masiello, 177 Misc. 608, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 512 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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that the union was violating the antitrust laws and that no labor dispute
existed within the statutory definition. The court, holding that the members
of the union were independent contractors, granted the injunction.7 The
corollary to the independent contractor holding was the further conclusion
that the dispute did not concern "terms or conditions of employment" as
required by Section 876(a) of the New York Civil Practice Act defining
labor disputes.8 The court also found that the newsdealers association was
not a union but a trade association and that, while it did not intend to
eliminate competition, its campaign had that "inevitable tendency" and was
a violation of the Donnelly Act,0 the state antitrust law.
This exclusion of an association of "entrepreneurs" from the protection
of the anti-injunction laws follows a policy which the Supreme Court of the
United States has, in a recent case, expressly approved. 10 That Court held
that the Norris-La Guardia Act gave no immunity from the antitrust laws
to an association of "commodity sellers" which has conspired to monopolize
the fish trade." The Court argued that groups of "independent businessmen"
masquerading as trade unionists have no legitimate claim to the privileges
which legislation has extended to bona fide labor unions. Although this
premise is undoubtedly sound, the criteria presently used are unsatisfactory
for distinguishing between those groups within, and those without, the
protection provided by the statutes.12
According to the law as it now stands, groups of independents are read
out of the statutes through the use of a criterion borrowed from the law
of agency and designed for tort, contract and workmen's compensation cases.
Formal relations and doubtful analogy should not be brought in to control
the decision of cases of this kind in the labor field. The essential inquiry
7. In this connection the degree.of control exercised by the publishers over the
newsdealers in relevant; see p. 1041 infra. The practices referred to have caused pre-
vious litigation. See Lucomsky v. Palmer, 141 Misc. 278, 252 N. Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct.
1931) ; Brown v. Metropolitan News Co., 149 Misc. 536, 267 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Sup, Ct.
1933).
8. See N. Y. CIV. PRAC. Acr § 876(a) (10) (c), N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477, § 10(c),
The same words occur in the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 STAT. 70, § 13(c) (1932), 29
U. S. C. § 113(c) (1940).
9. N. Y. GEN. BusiNEss LAw Art. 22 § 340, N. Y. Laws 1918, c. 490. Cases reach-
ing the result of the principal case are People v. Distributor's Division, 169 Misc. 255,
7 N. Y. S. (2d) 185 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Fertel v. Rosenzeig, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 6 (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
10. Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 62 Sup. Ct. 520 (U. S. 1942) (unan-
imous opinion).
11. In the Hinton case, cited supra note 10, the fishermen's union boycotted a packer
because he would not purchase fish exclusively from its members. Since his supply of
fish was thereby cut off he sought an injunction against the boycott. The Supreme Court
refused to extend labor immunities to a dispute between businessmen over the terms of
a contract of sale. It was held that to obtain protection under the Norris-La Guardia
Act a dispute must have some bearing on the employer-employee relationship. See
cases cited note 9 supra.
12. See 2 TELLER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 422. The small body of law on this mat-
ter is collected in Galenson and Spector, The New York Labor-Injunction Slatute and
the Courts (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 51, 55.
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is rather the nature of the demands made and the circumstances surrounding
the relationship between "independents" and those with whom they are
negotiating. Thus the independent contractor classification of itself should
not be enough to support the automatic' 3 issuance of an injunction' 4 when
the character of the demands pressed by the independents is equivalent to
the demands customarily presented to employers by bona fide employees.
The same is true when the relationship resembles the employer-employee
status - e.g., if the independents had at one time been employees, or if
financial aid is extended by the company to the independents to allow them
to secure equipment. In the principal case the publishers prescribe the place
where the newsdealer is to set up his stand, the number of papers he can
sell, how the papers are to be arranged on the stand, and the price at which
the papers are to be sold. These practices are characteristic of the employer-
employee relationship, and to deny the newsdealers the benefits of anti-in-
junction legislation may deprive them of the only economic weapons appro-
priate to their status.
Even if such restrictions are read into the anti-injunction laws, the constitu-
tional right to picket"5 peacefully should be extended to include groups other
than ordinary labor unions. The United States Supreme Court has declared
that peaceful picketing, even in the absence of an immediate employer-
employee relationship, is an exercise of the right of free speech.10 Further-
more, a recent decision of that Court makes it plain thab a state cannot
defeat the constitutional guarantee by limiting its application to a labor dis-
pute as narrowly defined by state law.' 7 In that case the New York Court
of Appeals had ruled that no "labor dispute" existed and therefore the
doctrine of Thornhill v. Alabama did not apply, where a bona fide union
was picketing customers of "independent vendors" in an effort to make the
vendors join the union and hire assistants.18 By this reversal of the Nei,
York decision, the Supreme Court has made the application of the Thorn-
hill doctrine a federal question. The Supreme Court has not as yet had
occasion to decide whether this protection is to extend to groups other than
labor unions.1 9 Since many non-labor groups have found picketing to be
13. See note 4 supra.
14. There is at least a hint that the United States Supreme Court will employ such
an approach. 'Mr. Justice Black in the first Milk Drivers case found it significant "that
the 'vendors' were actually regarded as employees" notwithstanding their independent
status. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91,
98 (1940). See Suchodolski v. American Federation of Labor, 127 N. J. Eq. 511, 14 A.
(2d) 51 (Ch. 1940).
15. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) (striking down a state anti-picketing
statute); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940) (voiding a county ordinance of
the same nature). It should be noticed that the failure of a state to enact an anti-injunc-
tion statute defining labor disputes has no bearing on the extent to which picketing as a
free speech right will be permitted. Alabama in the thornhill case, supra, had no such
statute.
16. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
17. Bakery Drivers' Union v. Wlohl. 62 Sup. Ct. 816 (U. S. 1942).
18. Wohl v. Bakery Drivers' Union, 285 N. Y. 843, 35 N. . (2d) 506 (1941).
19. But see New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938),
where a negro "betterment association" was permitted to picket a store refusing to employ
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a useful device for publicizing their economic grievances, the question is an
urgent one. The Court has been willing to extend a broad protection to
various types of civil liberties.20 Moreover, on principle it may be argued
that constitutional protection should be extended wherever the demands of
a group are not attended by violence or unnecessary hardship to strangers
to the issue.21 To limit the Thornhill doctrine to "labor unions" would
deprive similar groups from making known their legitimate grievances to
the public whose continued patronage may perpetuate existing injustices.
When in the Masiello case the effect of the Thornhill case was raised,
the court held that the doctrine of that decision does not apply where the
picketing is in restraint of trade. This "lawful objective" test 22 had pre-
viously been applied where the applicability of the New York anti-injunction
law was being considered. Particularly in the field of "labor activity" the
courts should not be permitted to read into the legislative or constitutional
declaration their own concepts of the legitimate end.23 To allow state courts
thus to limit the Thornhill doctrine would similarly emasculate the consti-
tutional right and leave its application completely dependent on interpreta-
tion by the state courts.
Exercise by state courts of such extensive interpretive powers contains
many possibilities for abuse. This is indicated by the Meadowmoor24 decision
which permits state courts to grant injunctions even against peaceful picket-
ing when violenge of a serious nature has occurred.25 In drawing the line
colored workers. This case preceded the Thornhill decision so that non-union picketing
was upheld without assistance from the First Amendment. See also Comment (1941)
41 COL. L. REv. 89.
20. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) (free religious communication)
see Bridges v. California, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (U. S. 1941). But cf. Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
21. See opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Carpenters' and Joiners' Union v.
Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (U. S. 1942).
22. Opera-on-Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), 51
YALE L. J. 144. See Schwab v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, .165 Ore. 602, 109 P.
(2d) 600 (1941). This doctrine deprives anti-injunction laws of their effectiveness. They
define lawfulness, yet this test allows courts to reenter the field from which these stat-
utes sought to remove them.
23. Cf. American Furniture Co. v. Chauffeurs', Teamsters' and Helpers' Local,
222 Wis. 338, 364, 268 N. W. 250, 262 (1936). See 1 TELLER, op. cit. snpra note
2, 59 (Supp. 1941). The judicial vicissitudes of Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAr.
731, §6 (1913), 29 U.S.C. §51 (1940), offer a familiar horrible example. See, c.y.,
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) ; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n., 274 U. S. 37 (1927).
24. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
25. See Borden Co. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) ; Chrisman v. Culinary Workers' Union, 115 P. (2d) 553 (Cal. App. 1941)
(noise is sufficient to justify injunction against picketing). Cf. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers' Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N. W. 31
(1941). Extreme examples which suppress peaceful picketing are Busch Jewelry Coin-
pany v. United Retail Employees' Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939) and
Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers' Club, 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 Atd. 309 (Ch. 1926)
(menacing silence is coercion).
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between the constitutional right and exercise of the state's power to preserve
order, the majority in the 2Acadow.moor case ruled that peaceful picketing
may continue unless the "momentum of fear"2 6 induced by the violence
makes impossible the preservation of peace.27 Only when the peaceful picket-
ing is so emneshed with contemporaneously violent conduct as to be a part
of a coercive thrust is an injunction justified. In theory this is a reasonable
compromise between the preservation of the Bill of Rights and the functions
of the state police power, but the result is not compatible with the freedom
of communication desirable for full airing of labor grievances. State court
decisions since the Mcadowmoor case have amply demonstrated the danger
of granting local courts power to nullify a constitutional right. -3 If a single
judge is convinced that future picketing will be violent, the union's attempts
to enlist public support will be enjoined, even though violence induced by
the employer will not curtail the latter's freedom of speech. 2 9 The Supreme
Court in the A.1eadowmoor case suggested criteria for testing the peaceful
character of picketing. These criteria, inevitably inexact, have in part made
possible the inequitable result just referred to.
The requirements of the Bill of Rights are to a degree in conflict with the
need for orderly settlement of disputes. As the scope of the Thornhill doc-
trine becomes clear, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly delimit the dis-
cretion which the states may exercise in resolving these opposing demands.
The states' discretion in resolving these opposing demands should be narrowly
limited by criteria laid down by the Supreme Court to define the scope of
the Thornhill doctrine. Standards such as the lawfulness of the objective,
mentioned in the principal case, are vague and unsatisfactory.30 And where
demands are made for public sympathy to remedy an economic or social
grievance, no distinction should be drawn between "labor" and "non-labor"
groups.
31
26. 312 U. S. 287, 294 (1941).
27. May's Furs and Ready-to-Wear. Inc. v. Bauer. 7R2 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. t2d)
279 (1940); Nana v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931). Cf. Mr. Justice
Black, dissenting in the Mcadowenor case, 312 U. S. 287, 299 (1941). The restrictive
possibilities of the Mcadowmoor case have been well resisted in Ellingsen '. Milk Wagon
Drivers' Union, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941). and Istlantite v. United Electrical
Radio Workers, 22 A. (2d) 796 (N. J. Ch. 1941). Only "clear and present danger"
justifies the abridgment of a constitutional right. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S.
47, 52 (1919). "The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of immi-
nence extremely high." Bridges v. California, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 194 (1941).
28. See note 24 supra. Mere suggestions of violence may lead to an injunction in
some courts. Such a result distorts the intent of the court in the Mcadozmnoor case.
... .It is of prime importance that no constitutional freedom, least of all the guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights, be defeated by insubstantial findings ouf act screening reality,"
312 U. S. 287, 293 (1941).
29. N. L. R. B. v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940), ccri. do-
nied, 312 U. S. 689 (1941).
30. And see Carpenters' and Joiners' Union v. Ritters Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. E97
(U. S. 1942).
31. Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 10 U. S. L. WANre 4335 (U. S. 1942).
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